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Abstract: We motivate procedural fairness for matching mechanisms and study two procedu-
rally fair and stable mechanisms: employment by lotto (Aldershof et al., 1999) and the random
order mechanism (Roth and Vande Vate, 1990, Ma, 1996). For both mechanisms we give vari-
ous examples of probability distributions on the set of stable matchings and discuss properties
that differentiate employment by lotto and the random order mechanism. Finally, we consider
an adjustment of the random order mechanism, the equitable random order mechanism, that
combines aspects of procedural and “endstate” fairness.
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1 Introduction
The marriage model describes a two-sided, one-to-one matching market without money where
the two sides of the market for instance are workers and firms (job matching) or medical students
and hospitals (matching of students to internships). We use the common terminology in the
literature and refer to one side of the market as “men” and to the other as “women.” An outcome
for a marriage market is called a matching, which can simply be described by a collection of
single agents and “married” pairs (consisting of one man and one woman). Loosely speaking, a
matching is stable if all agents have acceptable spouses and there is no couple whose members
both like each other better than their current spouses. Gale and Shapley (1962) formalized
this notion of stability for marriage markets and provided an algorithm to calculate stable
matchings. These classical results (Gale and Shapley, 1962) inspired many researchers to study
stability not only for the marriage model, but for more general models as well. We refer to Roth
and Sotomayor (1990) for a comprehensive account on stability for two-sided matching models.
In this paper we study fairness and stability in marriage markets. Masarani and Gok-
turk (1989) showed several impossibilities to obtain a fair deterministic matching mechanism
within the context of Rawlsian justice. In contrast to this cardinal approach we focus on the
ordinal aspects of the model and opt for an approach of procedural fairness. Since for any de-
terministic matching mechanism we can detect an inherent favoritism either for one side of the
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market or for some agents over others, in order to at least recover ex ante fairness, we consider
probabilistic matching mechanisms that assign to each marriage market a probability distribu-
tion on the set of stable matchings. We do not intend to judge the fairness of a probabilistic
matching mechanism by judging the assigned probability distributions (the “endstate”), but by
considering procedurally fair matching algorithms in which the sequence of moves for the agents
is drawn from a uniform distribution. Hence, whenever an agent has the same probability to
move at a certain point in the procedure that determines the final probability distribution, we
consider the random matching mechanism to be procedurally fair. In other words, here we fo-
cus on “procedural justice” rather than on endstate justice (see Moulin, 1997,2003). After a
discussion of procedural fairness, we explain our procedural fairness concept for matching mar-
kets, discuss two procedurally fair and stable matching mechanisms, and conclude with a stable
mechanism that combines some aspects of procedural and endstate fairness.
The first procedurally fair and stable matching mechanism we consider, called employment
by lotto, was proposed by Aldershof et al. (1999). Loosely speaking, employment by lotto can
be considered to be a random serial dictatorship on the set of stable matchings. A first agent
is drawn randomly and can discard all stable matchings in which he/she is not matched to
his/her best partner (possibly him-/herself) in a stable matching. Exclude the first agent and
his/her partner from the set of agents and randomly choose the next agent who can discard all
stable matchings in which he/she is not matched to his/her best partner in the reduced set of
stable matchings. Continue with this sequential reduction of the set of stable matchings until
it is reduced to a singleton. Using all possible sequences of agents, this mechanism induces a
probability distribution on the set of stable matchings. The associated probabilistic matching
mechanism of this probabilistic sequential dictatorship equals employment by lotto. We give
various examples of probability distributions on the set of stable matchings induced by employ-
ment by lotto and show certain limitations of this mechanism (e.g., complete information of all
agents’ preferences is needed).
The second procedurally fair and stable matching mechanism we consider is a random match-
ing mechanism based on Roth and Vande Vate’s (1990) results. We follow Ma (1996) and refer
to this rule as the random order mechanism. The basic idea is as follows. Imagine an empty
room with one entrance. At the beginning, all agents are waiting outside. At each step of the
algorithm one agent is chosen randomly and invited to enter. Before an agent enters, the match-
ing in the room is stable. However, once an agent enters the room, the existing matching in the
room may become unstable, meaning that the new agent can form a blocking pair with another
agent that already is present in the room. By satisfying this (and possible subsequent) blocking
pair(s) in a certain way a new stable matching including the entering agent is obtained for the
marriage market in the room. After a finite number of steps a stable matching for the original
marriage market is obtained. Using all possible sequences of agents, this mechanism induces a
probability distribution on the set of stable matching. The associated probabilistic matching
mechanism equals the random order mechanism. We give various examples of probability distri-
butions on the set of stable matchings induced by the random order mechanism. Furthermore,
we correct the probability distribution for the marriage market considered by Ma (1996). We
detected that the small mistake in the calculations by Ma (1996) is due to the fact that even
though the example looks very symmetric, some of the calculations are not as “symmetric” since
the random order mechanism does not satisfy what we call independence of dummy agents; that
is, the final probability distribution on the set of stable matchings may crucially depend on
preferences of agents who are matched to the same partner in all stable matchings.
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Third, following a suggestion by Romero-Medina (2002), we briefly discuss an adjustment of
the random order mechanism, the equitable random order mechanism, that combines aspects of
procedural and endstate fairness.
Our examples show that even for small markets the three mechanisms may give completely
different outcomes. In all our examples, we implement the mechanisms in Matlab c©. In some
examples the resulting probabilities are rounded.
The article is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce marriage markets and stability.
In Section 3 we first introduce and discuss procedural fairness. In Section 3.1 we study employ-
ment by lotto, in Section 3.2 the random order mechanism, and in Section 3.3 its adjustment,
the equitable random order mechanism. We conclude with Section 4.
2 Matching Markets and Stability
First we introduce the model of a two-sided one-to-one matching market without money. For
convenience we apply Gale and Shapley’s (1962) interpretation of a “marriage market.” For fur-
ther details on the interpretation and standard results we refer to Roth and Sotomayor’s (1990)
comprehensive book on two-sided matching.
There are two finite and disjoint sets of agents: a set M = {m1, . . . ,ma} of “men” and a set
W = {w1, . . . , wb} of “women,” where possibly a 6= b. The set of agents equals N = M ∪W .
Let n = |N |. We denote a generic agent by i, a generic man by m, and a generic woman by w.
Each agent has a complete, transitive, and strict preference relation over the agents on
the other side of the market and the prospect of being alone. Hence, man m’s preferences
ºm can be represented as a strict ordering P (m) of the elements in W ∪ {m}, for instance:
P (m) = w3w2mw1 . . . w4 indicates that m prefers w3 to w2 and he prefers remaining single to
any other woman. Similarly, woman w’s preferences ºw can be represented as a strict ordering
P (w) of elements in M ∪ {w}. Let P be the profile of all agents’ preferences: P = (P (i))i∈N .
We write wÂmw′ if m strictly prefers w to w′ (w 6= w′), and wºmw′ if m likes w at least
as well as w′ (wÂmw′ or w = w′). Similarly we write mÂwm′ and mºwm′. A woman w is
acceptable to a man m if wÂmm. Analogously, m is acceptable to w if mÂww.
A marriage market is a triple (M,W,P ). A matching for a marriage market (M,W,P ) is
a one-to-one function µ from N to itself, such that for each m ∈ M and for each w ∈ W we
have µ(m) = w if and only if µ(w) = m, µ(m) 6∈W implies µ(m) = m, and similarly µ(w) 6∈M
implies µ(w) = w. If µ(m) = w, then man m and woman w are matched to one another.
If µ(i) = i, then agent i is single. We call µ(i) the match of agent i at µ. When denoting
a matching µ we list the women that are matched to men m1,m2, . . ., e.g., µ = w3w4m3w1
denotes a matching where m1 is matched to w3, m2 to w4, m3 to himself, and m4 to w1.
A key property of matchings is stability. First, since agents can always choose to be single,
we require a voluntary participation condition. A matching µ is individually rational if only
acceptable agents are matched to one another, i.e., µ(i)ºii for all i ∈ N . Second, if an agent
can improve upon his/her present match by switching to another agent such that this agent
is better off as well, then we would expect this mutually beneficial “trade” to be carried out,
rendering the given matching instable. For a given matching µ, a pair (m,w) is a blocking pair if
they are not matched to one another but prefer one another to their matches at µ, i.e., wÂmµ(m)
and mÂwµ(w). A matching is stable if it is individually rational and if there are no blocking
pairs. With a slight abuse of notation, we denote the set of stable matchings for marriage market
3
(M,W,P ) by S(P ). Gale and Shapley (1962) proved that S(P ) 6= ∅. Furthermore, any set of
stable matchings has the structure of a (distributive) lattice, which we explain next.
For any two matchings µ and µ′ we define the function λ := µ ∨M µ′ on N that assigns to
each man his more preferred match from µ and µ′ and to each woman her less preferred match.
Formally, let λ = µ ∨M µ′ be defined for all m ∈ M by λ(m) := µ(m) if µ(m)Âmµ′(m) and
λ(m) := µ′(m) otherwise, and for all w ∈W by λ(w) := µ(w) if µ′(w)Âwµ(w) and λ(w) := µ′(w)
otherwise. Similarly, we define the function µ∧M µ′ that gives each man his less preferred match
and each woman her more preferred match. The following theorem (published by Knuth, 1976,
but attributed to John Conway) establishes the lattice structure of the set of stable matchings.
Theorem 2.1 [Lattice Theorem] If µ, µ′ ∈ S(P ), then also µ ∨M µ′, µ ∧M µ′ ∈ S(P ).
From Theorem 2.1 and the existence of a stable matching it follows easily that there is a stable
matching µM that is optimal for all men in the sense that no other stable matching µ gives to
any man m a match µ(m) that he prefers to µM (m). Similarly, there is a stable matching µW
that is optimal for all women. In fact, Gale and Shapley (1962) already provided an algorithm,
called the deferred acceptance procedure, to calculate µM and µW .
Since preferences are strict, the set of matched agents does not vary from one stable matching
to another (Roth, 1982), i.e., the set of single agents is the same for all stable matchings.
Theorem 2.2 For all i ∈ N and all µ, µ′ ∈ S(P ), µ(i) = i implies µ′(i) = i.
3 Procedural Fairness
Typing the keyword “procedural fairness” into an internet search engine confirms that the is-
sue of procedural fairness is central in many areas of our lives: a Google search (conducted
on October 21st, 2004) resulted in many “webreferences” on procedural fairness in personnel
and office management (e.g., concerning staff dismissal or promotion), legal applications of pro-
cedural fairness (e.g., in family and employment law), and procedural fairness guidelines for
private schools and universities. Apart from administrative and legal applications, procedural
fairness also plays an important role in economics. Two recent papers that empirically investi-
gate procedural fairness in economic environments are Anand (2001) and Bolton et al. (2004).
Anand (2001) argues for the relevance of procedural fairness in economics and social choice
and uses survey data to analyze various hypotheses on different aspects of procedural fairness.
Bolton et al. (2004) use experimental data to analyze the distinction and relation between pro-
cedural and allocation (endstate) fairness for ultimatum games and “battle-of-the-sexes” games.
We refer the interested reader to these two papers for further references of procedural fairness
in administrative and management sciences, economics, law, and psychology.
The notion of procedural fairness we are interested in is equivalent to Rawls’s (1971, p. 86)
pure procedural justice: “By contrast, pure procedural justice obtains when there is no inde-
pendent criterion for the right result: instead there is a correct or fair procedure such that the
outcome is likewise correct or fair, whatever it is, provided that the procedure has been properly
followed. This situation is illustrated by gambling. If a number of persons engage in a series of
fair bets, the distribution of cash after the last bet is fair, or at least not unfair, whatever this
distribution is.” As in Rawls’s (1971) pure procedural justice, we introduce procedural fairness
in a situation in which there is no criterion for what constitutes a fair outcome other than the
procedure itself. His classification of fair gambling as procedurally just already points towards
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the formalization of procedural fairness that we apply in our matching context: we will use
matching mechanisms that are based on fair lotteries (uniform randomization) as a means to
establish procedural fairness.
We are interested in matching mechanisms that produce stable matchings and that can be
considered “fair.” Before explaining the concept of procedural fairness that we apply here, we
define stable matching mechanisms. A stable matching mechanism µ is a function that for any
marriage market (M,W,P ) assigns a stable matching µ(M,W,P ).
Two well-known and widely applied stable matching mechanisms are the man-optimal and
the woman-optimal deferred acceptance (DA) algorithm by Gale and Shapley (1962). As dis-
cussed in Section 2, for any marriage market (M,W,P ), the man-optimal DA algorithm yields
the (unique) stable matching preferred by all men and the woman-optimal DA algorithm yields
the (unique) stable matching preferred by all women. However, although stable, for all marriage
markets where the man-optimal matching differs from the woman-optimal matching, which is
the rule rather than the exception, each of the matching mechanisms clearly favors one side of
the market. If there is no obvious reason why one side of the market should be favored, this
favoritism can be considered “unfair.”
This inherent incompatibility between stability and fairness is not restricted to the man-
optimal and the woman-optimal DA algorithm, but in fact extends to all deterministic matching
rules. Given the lattice structure of the set of stable matchings, for some marriage markets
any deterministic matching mechanism is bound to favor one side of the market; for instance
whenever the set of stable matchings consist of a man-optimal and a woman-optimal matching.
Even if the matching mechanism does not choose a man-optimal or woman-optimal matching
whenever possible, depending on the lattice structure of stable matchings, some agents may have
to be favored relative to other agents on both sides of the market. Therefore, in order to formulate
fairness without sacrificing stability, we consider probabilistic stable matching mechanisms, that
is, for each marriage problem (M,W,P ) a probabilistic stable matching mechanism assigns a
probability distribution P(M,W,P ) over the set of stable matchings S(P ).
We do not intend to judge the fairness of a probabilistic stable matching mechanism by judg-
ing the endstate, that is, the assigned probability distributions, but by considering procedurally
fair matching algorithms in which the sequence of moves for the agents is drawn from a uniform
distribution. Loosely speaking, whenever each agent has the same probability to move at a
certain point in the procedure that determines the final probability distribution, we consider the
respective probabilistic stable matching mechanism to be procedurally fair.
3.1 Procedural Fairness: Employment by Lotto
Aldershof et al. (1999) proposed a probabilistic stable matching mechanism, called employment
by lotto that can be considered to be a random serial dictatorship on the set of stable matchings.
A first agent is drawn randomly and can discard all stable matchings in which he/she is not
matched to his/her best partner (possibly him-/herself) in a stable matching. Note that now the
first agent is matched to the same partner in all remaining stable matchings. Exclude the first
agent and his/her partner from the set of agents and randomly choose the next agent who can
discard all stable matchings in which he/she is not matched to his/her best partner in the reduced
set of stable matchings. Continue with this sequential reduction of the set of stable matchings
until it is reduced to a singleton. Using all possible sequences of agents, this mechanism induces
a probability distribution on the set of stable matchings. The associated probabilistic matching
mechanism of this probabilistic sequential dictatorship mechanism equals employment by lotto.
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Aldershof et al.’s (1999) original definition of employment by lotto combines a proposal algorithm
with a refining process of the set of linear inequalities that describe the set of stable matchings.
The Employment by Lotto Algorithm
As mentioned before, we opt for a different description of the procedure than Aldershof et
al. (1999); see also Klaus and Klijn (2004a). The description of employment by lotto as a
probabilistic sequential dictatorship mechanism on the set of stable matchings enables us to
avoid introducing further notation and technicalities.
Employment by Lotto (EL) Algorithm
Input: A marriage market (M,W,P ). Set N1 := N , S1 := S(P ), and t := 1.
Step t : Choose an agent it from Nt at random.
Match agent it to his/her most preferred match ch(it) among {j : j = µ(it) for some µ ∈ St}.
If Nt\{it, ch(it)} = ∅, then stop and define {EL(P )} := St. Otherwise set
Nt+1 := Nt\{it, ch(it)}, St+1 := St\{µ ∈ St : µ(it) 6= ch(it)}, and go to Step t := t+ 1.
Recall that |M | = a and |W | = b. It is easy to see that the algorithm ends in a finite number
r (max{a, b} ≤ r ≤ a + b) of steps that only depends on the preferences (this follows from
Theorem 2.2). The outcome is a random stable matching EL(P ) ∈ S(P ), generated by a
sequence of agents (i1, . . . , ir). Let Q be the set of such sequences and let q = |Q|. Moreover,
for any µ ∈ S(P ), let Qµ ⊆ Q be the (possibly empty) set of sequences that lead to µ. Denote
qµ = |Qµ|. Note that if a = b and if all men and women are mutually acceptable, then r = a
and q = 2a · (2a− 2) · . . . · 2.
The employment by lotto algorithm induces in a natural way a probability distribution
P = {pµ}µ∈S(P ) over the set of stable matchings: for any µ ∈ S(P ), the probability that
EL(P ) = µ equals pµ =
qµ
q . The following example shows that a stable matching that constitutes
an endstate compromise between contrary preferences on both sides of the market may never
result from employment by lotto.1
Example 3.1 Employment by lotto may never find an endstate compromise
Let (M,W,P ) with a = b = 3 and P listed below. The three stable matchings for this market
are listed below as well.
Preferences Stable Matchings
P (m1) = w1 w˜2 w3 m1 µ = w3 w2 w1
P (m2) = w3 w˜1 w2 m2 µ˜ = w2 w1 w3
P (m3) = w2 w˜3 w1 m3 µ = w1 w3 w2
P (w1) = m3 m˜2 m1 w1
P (w2) = m2 m˜1 m3 w2
P (w3) = m1 m˜3 m2 w3
1Aldershof et al. (1999) observe that if a stable matching µ does not match any agent to his/her man/woman
optimal match, then pµ = 0. More precisely, if for all i ∈ N it holds that µM (i) 6= µ(i) 6= µW (i), then pµ = 0.
Klaus and Klijn (2004a) use an extension of the marriage market in Example 3.1 to prove that the converse is
not true, i.e., pµ = 0 does not necessarily imply that for all i ∈ N , µM (i) 6= µ(i) 6= µW (i).
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Note that in matching µ all men are matched to their most preferred match and all women are
matched to their least preferred match (µ = µM is underlined at preference profile P )2. Matching
µ establishes the other extreme: all women are matched to their most preferred match and all
man are matched to their least preferred match (µ = µW ). At matching µ˜ agents are matched
neither to their most, nor to their least preferred match. In fact, at µ˜ all agents are matched to
their second choice, which is why we consider µ˜ to be an endstate compromise in this situation.
We depict the corresponding lattice in Figure 1. The nodes denote the stable matchings and
the first number in each series is the corresponding probability resulting from employment by
lotto (the other two numbers are probabilities from other random matching mechanisms that we
discuss later). The solid arcs denote comparability or unanimity on each side of the market. For
instance µ→ µ˜ in Figure 1 means that all men weakly prefer their matches at µ˜ to their matches
at µ and all women weakly prefer their matches at µ to their matches at µ˜ (i.e., µ ∨M µ˜ = µ˜).
0.5/0.5/0
0/0/1
0.5/0.5/0m_
m
_
m~
Figure 1: Lattice of Example 3.1
It is easy to check that whenever agent i1 in the EL algorithm is a man, then EL(P ) = µM ,
and whenever agent i1 in the EL algorithm is a woman, then EL(P ) = µW . So, pµM =
1
2 = pµW .
Hence, for the endstate compromise matching µ˜, pµ˜ = 0. ¦
Finally, one might think that the employment by lotto algorithm is equivalent to the following
procedure: first pick an agent i1 at random, match i1 to ch(i1), and remove i1 and ch(i1) from
the marriage market and the preference lists of the remaining agents. Repeat this procedure
with the reduced marriage market, etc. Unfortunately, this procedure may not find a stable
matching since, for instance, ch(i1) and ch(i2) thus obtained may form a blocking pair for the
resulting matching. We demonstrate this using the marriage market introduced in Example 3.1.
Suppose that m1 first chooses w1. In the reduced market there are two stable matchings: at µ1
men m2,m3 are matched to w3, w2 and at µ2 men m2,m3 are matched to w2, w3. Next, assume
that w2 can choose in the reduced market. Since w2 prefers her match at µ2 over her match
at µ1, the resulting matching for the original market matches men m1,m2,m3 to w1, w2, w3.
However, this matching is not stable ((m2, w1) is a blocking pair).
Hence, in general it is necessary to calculate the complete set of stable matchings.
Properties of Employment by Lotto
We discuss two properties that set employment by lotto apart from the second procedurally
fair matching mechanism that we consider in Section 3.2. First, we explain that employment
2Matchings µ and µ˜ are marked in a similar way.
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by lotto is based on a strong information requirement. Next, we point out that the probability
distributions obtained by employment by lotto do not depend on agents that are matched to
the same partner in all stable matchings.
Complete Information needed: As mentioned before, in order to apply employment by lotto
it is necessary to calculate the set of stable matchings. From an informational point of view that
means that a central planner or all agents need complete information of preferences.
We call an agent that is matched to the same partner (including being single) at all stable
matchings a dummy agent. We call a probabilistic stable matching mechanism independent of
dummy agents if dummy agents have no influence on the final probability distribution in the
following sense. Delete all dummy agents from the original set of agents and apply the matching
mechanism to the obtained reduced marriage market. Then, the probabilities for the remaining
agents do not change. In order to formalize this property, we need some notation. Let (M,W,P )
be a marriage market and let D ⊆ N be the set of all dummy agents. Then M\D denotes all
men that are not dummy agents, W\D denotes all women that are not dummy agents, and
PN\D = (P (i)N\D)i∈N\D denotes the profile of reduced preferences induced by (P (i))i∈N\D.
Formally, for all i ∈ M\D and all j, k ∈ {i} ∪W\D, if j ºi k at P (i), then j ºi k at P (i)N\D.
(Similarly for i ∈ W\D.) Then, after eliminating all dummy agents, we obtain the reduced
marriage market (M\D,W\D,PN\D). Note that there exists a one-to-one mapping between
matchings in S(P ) and S(PN\D): by eliminating dummy agents from a matching µ ∈ S(P )
we obtain a matching µN\D ∈ S(PN\D), and vice versa, by adding dummy agents with their
respective matches to a matching µN\D ∈ S(PN\D) we obtain a matching µ ∈ S(P ).
Independence of Dummy Agents: Let (M,W,P ) be a marriage market and P˜ the proba-
bility distribution on the corresponding set of stable matchings induced by a probabilistic stable
matching mechanism, that is, for all matchings µ ∈ S(P ), P˜(µ) denotes the probability that
matching µ is chosen. Similarly, for the reduced marriage market (M\D,W\D,PN\D), P˜(µN\D)
denotes the probability that the reduced matching µN\D is chosen.
Then, the matching mechanism satisfies independence of dummy agents for (M,W,P ) if
and only if for all matchings µ ∈ S(P ), P˜(µ) = P˜(µN\D). The matching mechanism satisfies
independence of dummy agents if it satisfies independence of dummy agents for all marriage
markets.
Since in the employment by lotto algorithm a dummy agent will never reduce the set of
remaining stable matchings, it is easy to see that employment by lotto satisfies independence
of dummy agents.
We finish the discussion of employment by lotto with two illustrative examples which we will
also discuss in Section 3.3. For any stable matching lattice we depict, the first number labelling
a stable matching µ equals pµ.
Example 3.2 Let (M,W,P ) with a = b = 5 and P the preferences given by Table 1 in the
Appendix.3 The set of stable matchings is depicted in Table 1 as well. Note that µM = µ6
and µW = µ1. We depict the corresponding lattice in Figure 2. The solid arcs denote again
comparability or unanimity on each side of the market. Dotted edges denote incomparability
or disagreement on each side of the market. For instance µ4 · · ·µ5 in Figure 2 means that
there is disagreement among the men (women) about which matching is better (for instance,
µ5(m2) Âm2 µ4(m2), but µ4(m4) Âm4 µ5(m4)). ¦
3We complete the preferences of a marriage market taken from Blair (1984).
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Figure 2: Lattice of Example 3.2
Example 3.3 Let (M,W,P ) with a = b = 4 and P the preferences given by Table 2 in the Ap-
pendix. The set of stable matchings is depicted in Table 2 as well. We depict the corresponding
lattice in Figure 3. ¦
5
4
4
2
1
6
0.042/0.131/0.5
0.104/0.055/0.5
0.354/0.354/0
0.042/0.036/0
0.354/0.369/0
0.104/0.055/0 n
n
3
n
n
n
n
Figure 3: Lattice of Example 3.3
3.2 Procedural Fairness: the Random Order Mechanism
Ma (1996) described the random order mechanism, which is based on Roth and Vande
Vate’s (1990) random paths to stability. The basic idea is as follows. Imagine an empty room
with one entrance. At the beginning, all agents are waiting outside. At each step of the algo-
rithm, one agent is chosen randomly and invited to enter. Before an agent enters, the matching
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in the room is stable. However, once an agent enters the room, the existing matching in the room
may become unstable, meaning that the new agent can form a blocking pair with another agent
that already is present in the room. By satisfying this (and possible subsequent) blocking pair(s)
in a certain way (described below in full detail) a new stable matching including the entering
agent is obtained for the marriage market in the room. Since at each step a new agent enters
the room and no agent leaves the room, the final outcome is a stable matching for the original
marriage market. Using all possible sequences of agents, this mechanism induces a probability
distribution on the set of stable matchings. The associated probabilistic matching mechanism
equals the random order mechanism.
The Random Order Mechanism
We first give a formal description of the random order mechanism.
Random Order (RO) Mechanism
Input: A marriage market (M,W,P ).
Set R0 := ∅, µ0 such that for all i ∈ N , µ0(i) = i, and t := 1.
Step t : Choose an agent it from N\Rt−1 at random. Set Rt := Rt−1 ∪ {it}.
Suppose it = w ∈W . (Otherwise replace w by m in Step t.)
Stable Room Procedure
Case (i) There exists no blocking pair (m,w) for µt−1 with m ∈ Rt:
Stop if t = n and define RO(P ) := µt−1. Otherwise set µt = µt−1 and go to Step t := t+ 1.
Case (ii) There exists a blocking pair (m,w) for µt−1 with m ∈ Rt:
Choose the blocking pair (m∗, w) for µt−1 with m∗ ∈ Rt that w prefers most.
If µt−1(m∗) = m∗, then define µt such that µt(w) := m∗, µt(m∗) := w, and for all i ∈ N\{w,m∗},
µt(i) := µt−1(i). Stop if t = n and define RO(P ) := µt. Otherwise go to Step t := t+ 1.
If µt−1(m∗) = w′ ∈W , then redefine µt−1(w) := m∗, µt−1(m∗) := w, µt−1(w′) := w′, and for all
i ∈ N\{w,m∗, w′}, µt−1(i) := µt−1(i). Set w := w′, and repeat the Stable Room Procedure.
It is not difficult to see that the algorithm ends in exactly n steps. The outcome is a random
stable matching RO(P ) ∈ S(P ), generated by a sequence of agents (i1, . . . , in). The set of
possible sequences of agents equals the set of permutations of all agents denoted by Q∗. Hence,
|Q∗| = n!. Moreover, for any µ ∈ S(P ), let Q∗µ ⊆ Q∗ be the (possibly empty) set of sequences
that lead to µ. Denote q∗µ = |Q∗µ|.
The random order mechanism induces in a natural way a probability distribution P∗ over
the set of stable matchings: for any µ ∈ S(P ), the probability that RO(P ) = µ equals p∗µ = q
∗
µ
n! .
For any stable matching lattice we depict, the second number labelling a stable matching µ
equals p∗µ.
Note that, similarly as employment by lotto, the random order mechanism never chooses the
“endstate compromise” matching µ˜ in Example 3.1.
Properties of the Random Order Mechanism
We compare the random order mechanism with employment by lotto, using the same properties
as in Section 3.1.
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No Complete Information needed: An important advantage of the random order mechanism
over employment by lotto is that it is not necessary to calculate the set of stable matchings
beforehand. In order to be a part in the random order mechanism, each agent only needs to
know his/her own preferences.
The following example shows however that the random order mechanism fails to satisfy inde-
pendence of dummy agents.
Example 3.4 The random order mechanism does not satisfy independence of
dummy agents. Let (M,W,P ) with a = b = 3 and P the preferences given below.
Preferences Stable Matchings
P (m1) = w1 w2 w3 m1 µW = w2 w1 w3
P (m2) = w2 w1 w3 m2 µM = w1 w2 w3
P (m3) = w3 w2 w1 m3
P (w1) = m2 m1 m3 w1
P (w2) = m1 m3 m2 w2
P (w3) = m3 m2 m1 w3
Some calculations give (p∗µM , p
∗
µW
) = ( 512 ,
7
12).
After elimination of the two dummy agentsm3 and w3, we obtain the marriage market (Mˆ, Wˆ , Pˆ )
with a = b = 2 and Pˆ the preferences given below.
Preferences Stable Matchings
Pˆ (m1) = w1 w2 m1 µˆW = w2 w1
Pˆ (m2) = w2 w1 m1 µˆM = w1 w2
Pˆ (w1) = m2 m1 w1
Pˆ (w2) = m1 m2 w2
Some calculations give (p∗µˆM , p
∗
µˆW
) = (12 ,
1
2) 6= ( 512 , 712). Hence, the random order mechanism
violates independence of dummy agents. ¦
Ma (1996) showed that the random order mechanism may not reach all stable matchings.
Although Ma’s (1996) proof of this result is correct, we show in Example 3.5 that the proba-
bility distribution he obtained in addition was not correct. In fact, Ma’s (1996) verification of
probabilities would have been correct under independence of dummy agents.
Example 3.5 Let (M,W,P ) with a = b = 4 and P the preferences given by Table 3 in the
Appendix.4 We depict the corresponding lattice of stable matchings in Figure 4. Ma (1996)
claimed that (p∗µ1 , p
∗
µ2 , p
∗
µ3 , p
∗
µ4 , p
∗
µ5 , p
∗
µ6 , p
∗
µ7 , p
∗
µ8 , p
∗
µ9 , p
∗
µ10) = (
1
4 ,
1
8 ,
1
8 , 0, 0, 0, 0,
1
8 ,
1
8 ,
1
4), but it is
clear from Figure 4 that this is not true. Note however that EL does give these probabilities.
A proof that Ma’s (1996) claim on the probabilities in this example is wrong (that is, P∗ 6= P)
that does not rely on our computational results can be found in Klaus and Klijn (2004b). ¦
Cechla´rova´ (2002) extended Ma’s result showing that for any marriage market the only
matchings that may be obtained are those that assign to at least one agent his/her best stable
partner. One of the open problems Cechla´rova´ (2002, p. 4) mentioned is that “... it is not clear
whether for each of those not excluded it is possible to find a suitable order of players [agents]
4This is a marriage market taken from Knuth (1976).
11
10
8 9
0.250/0.238/0
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m
m
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4
2 3
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0/0/0.250
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m
m
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7
5 6
0/0/0.250
0/0/0.2500/0/0.250 mm
Figure 4: Lattice of Example 3.5
to get it.” We answer this question by showing that a stable matching where some agents
are matched to their best stable partner may never result from the random order mechanism.
Consider the marriage market in Example 3.1 and add two agents m4, w4 such that for all
i = 1, 2, 3, 4, m4 Âm4 wi, w4 Âw4 mi, and m4, w4 are placed anywhere in the preferences of the
other agents. Now the previously stable matching µ˜ = w2, w1, w3 for the market in Example 3.1
extends to the stable matching µ˜ = w2, w1, w3, w4 for the extended market. It is not difficult
to see, however, that p∗µ˜ = 0, i.e., it is not possible to find a suitable order of agents to reach µ˜
using the random order mechanism.
3.3 A Hybrid between Procedural Fairness and Endstate Justice:
The Equitable Random Order Mechanism
Romero-Medina (2002) adapted the random order mechanism in order to limit the set of options
available for each agent, trying to avoid in this way the inherent favoritism of optimal matchings.
As a result, he mixes aspects of procedural and endstate fairness.
Since the description of his algorithm would be a bit tedious and we only discuss briefly the
differences between the three mechanisms in a few examples, we refer the reader to Romero-
Medina (2002) for its definition. In fact, Romero-Medina (2002) defined the algorithm for a
fixed order of the agents and only in his final remarks suggested an extension by randomizing
the order of the agents. Henceforth, we will call this extension the equitable random order
mechanism.
For any marriage market (M,W,P ) and any µ ∈ S(P ), let p¯µ be the probability that µ is
the outcome of the equitable random order (ERO) mechanism. For any stable matching lattice
we depict, the third number labelling a stable matching µ equals p¯µ.
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In contrast to employment by lotto and the random order mechanism, the ERO mechanism
chooses the “endstate compromise” matching µ˜ in Example 3.1 not only with positive probability,
but in fact with probability one. In the classical Example 3.5 the ERO mechanism demonstrates
again nicely its avoidance of optimal matchings. The same occurs in Examples 3.2 and 3.3,
although here probabilities seem to be split more arbitrarily.
In the example below we show that already for a = b = 3 the three mechanisms may give
completely different and somewhat surprising outcomes. More specifically, it shows that the
ERO mechanism may not always choose a probabilistic solution that “endstate compromises”
between both sides of the market (as it did in Example 3.1): unlike the other two mechanisms,
here the ERO mechanism always chooses the woman optimal matching µW .
Example 3.6 Recall that for the matching market in Example 3.4 there are two stable match-
ings µM = w1, w2, w3 and µW = w2, w1, w3. From Example 3.4, (p∗µM , p
∗
µW
) = ( 512 ,
7
12). Some
calculations give (pµM , pµW ) = (
1
2 ,
1
2) and (p¯µM , p¯µW ) = (0, 1). Note that the equitable random
order mechanism fails to avoid the favoritism of one of the optimal matchings (µW ). In con-
trast, the order two mechanisms, employment by lotto and the random order mechanism, spread
probability over the two stable matchings, albeit in a slightly different way. ¦
4 Concluding Remarks
In Sections 1 and 3 we have explained why in many two-sided matching markets it is not possible
to implement a stable matching that at the same time does not favor one side of the market over
the other. In a recent paper Klaus and Klijn (2004c) propose so-called median stable matchings
as one way of choosing an endstate compromise. However, in order to guarantee a unique median
matching, the number of stable matchings has to be odd.
In this article, we focus on another important aspect of fairness – procedural fairness – that
has been known to affect many real life situations such as workplace regulations, family law,
and general conflict resolution. We follow Rawls’s (1971) notion of pure procedural justice and
argue that in the absence of an objective criterion on the fairness of outcomes/end-states, the
fairness of the procedure will lead to (procedurally) fair outcomes.
The most commonly known and applied stable matching mechanism is Gale and Shap-
ley’s (1962) deferred acceptance algorithm. In this algorithm, loosely speaking, only one side of
the market can make offers while the other side can only accept or reject offers. Equivalently,
the deferred acceptance algorithm can be formulated as an algorithm in which first all agents of
one side of the market move and then all agents of the other side (Roth and van de Vate, 1990,
Section 3). Since one side of the market has a “last mover advantage” that guarantees their best
possible stable matching, clearly the deferred acceptance algorithm is neither procedurally nor
endstate fair. By choosing the sequence of agents in a matching algorithm randomly such that
agents’ probabilities to move at a certain point in the algorithm are all the same, we introduce
procedural fairness.
Apart from modelling procedural fairness for two-sided matching markets, we identify two
known matching mechanisms as procedurally fair: employment by lotto and the random or-
der mechanism (Sections 3.1 and 3.2). We try to complete the understanding of these stable
matching mechanisms by giving various examples of matching markets and the probability dis-
tributions that are induced by employment by lotto and the random order mechanism. In order
to understand better both mechanisms, we also identify two properties that differentiate them.
Employment by lotto is based on complete information on the set of stable matchings, but it
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is independent of dummy agents. For the random order mechanism the reverse holds true: to
participate in the random order algorithm each agent only needs to know his/her preferences,
but dummy agents can influence the final outcome. Hence, these two properties allow for a
clear distinction between the two mechanisms and a mechanism designer may use the complete
information criterion or independence of dummy agents to choose between the two procedurally
fair and stable matching mechanisms.
A Appendix
Preferences Stable Matchings
P (m1) = w1 w3 w2 w4 w5 m1 µ1 = w3 w1 w2 w5 w4
P (m2) = w2 w3 w1 w4 w5 m2 µ2 = w3 w1 w2 w4 w5
P (m3) = w3 w2 w1 w4 w5 m3 µ3 = w1 w3 w2 w5 w4
P (m4) = w4 w5 w1 w2 w3 m4 µ4 = w1 w3 w2 w4 w5
P (m5) = w5 w4 w1 w2 w3 m5 µ5 = w1 w2 w3 w5 w4
P (w1) = m2 m1 m3 m4 m5 w1 µ6 = w1 w2 w3 w4 w5
P (w2) = m3 m2 m1 m4 m5 w2
P (w3) = m1 m2 m3 m4 m5 w3
P (w4) = m5 m4 m1 m2 m3 w4
P (w5) = m4 m5 m1 m2 m3 w5
Table 1: Preferences and stable matchings of Example 3.2
Preferences Stable Matchings
P (m1) = w1 w2 w4 w3 m1 ν1 = w3 w4 w1 w2
P (m2) = w2 w1 w3 w4 m2 ν2 = w4 w3 w1 w2
P (m3) = w3 w4 w1 w2 m3 ν3 = w4 w1 w3 w2
P (m4) = w4 w3 w1 w2 m4 ν4 = w2 w3 w1 w4
P (w1) = m3 m2 m1 m4 w1 ν5 = w2 w1 w3 w4
P (w2) = m4 m1 m2 m3 w2 ν6 = w1 w2 w3 w4
P (w3) = m1 m2 m3 m4 w3
P (w4) = m2 m1 m4 m3 w4
Table 2: Preferences and stable matchings of Example 3.3
14
Preferences Stable Matchings
P (m1) = w1 w2 w3 w4 m1 µ1 = w4 w3 w2 w1
P (m2) = w2 w1 w4 w3 m2 µ2 = w4 w3 w1 w2
P (m3) = w3 w4 w1 w2 m3 µ3 = w3 w4 w2 w1
P (m4) = w4 w3 w2 w1 m4 µ4 = w3 w4 w1 w2
P (w1) = m4 m3 m2 m1 w1 µ5 = w3 w1 w4 w2
P (w2) = m3 m4 m1 m2 w2 µ6 = w2 w4 w1 w3
P (w3) = m2 m1 m4 m3 w3 µ7 = w2 w1 w4 w3
P (w4) = m1 m2 m3 m4 w4 µ8 = w2 w1 w3 w4
µ9 = w1 w2 w4 w3
µ10 = w1 w2 w3 w4
Table 3: Preferences and stable matchings of Example 3.5
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